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Abstract
Western European politics have been marked over the last 
couple of decades by a fierce debate about the place of Europe’s 
increasingly large immigrant population in society. Across the 
continent, far-right parties campaigning on nationalistic platforms 
opposing immigration have seen great electoral success. The 
debate is undoubtedly becoming more heated as more immigrants 
pour into the area, and these anti-immigrant parties seem to have 
established themselves in the political arena. Immigration does 
not appear to be slowing down at any point in the near future, 
so what is going to happen to these far-right parties as we move 
into the future? My research sought to answer this question and 
offer a more optimistic outlook on the situation. The most popular 
opinions view the relationship between immigrant population size 
and anti-immigrant electoral support as a simple positive linear 
correlation, meaning that there is little hope that the existing 
enmity will do anything but increase. I hoped to show that the 
relationship is, in fact, curvilinear. In the case of these immigrants, 
a curvilinear relationship would indicate strong xenophobic 
voting until the immigrant population becomes so large that the 
non-immigrants become more accustomed to the presence of 
those that they formerly viewed as “outsiders.” What I discovered 
was that an alternative hypothesis provided the best description. 
As the immigrant population increased, the support for the far 
right actually decreased. This “contact hypothesis” shows that 
the increased population leads to increased interaction with 
immigrants and the weakening of stereotypes perpetuated by the 
extreme right. 
Introduction
As europe moves forward into the 21st century, it faces a 
stark new reality. the end of the cold War, combined with the 
burgeoning integration that would lead to the european Union as 
we know it today, raised hopes of a more peaceful and successful 
europe for the new millennium. However, issues of migration 
did not take long in exposing deep fault lines in this new, unified 
european community. conflicts are no longer along ideological 
lines of capitalism versus communism, but rather along lines 
of ethnicity and religion. strong national allegiances are slowly 
giving way to concerns and questions about the very nature of 
the nation’s identity. the undeniable truth of the past several 
decades is that the face of europe is changing, facilitated in part by 
historically low birth rates among so-called “ethnic” europeans.
Responses to these demographic shifts have varied, with 
some viewing them as an opportunity for further development, 
and others seeing them as a challenge to perceived european 
values. some of the most vehement reactions come from far-right 
anti-immigrant political parties. though these groups have yet to 
achieve governing status in most governments, their voices have 
proven to be very influential in the immigration debate. A mere 
glimpse of recent headlines shows this to be true, as a series of 
measures have been implemented that disproportionally affect 
immigrant communities. 
In recent years, european immigration research has focused 
on the motivations for anti-immigrant attitudes. existing studies 
have examined the relationship between these attitudes and the 
size of the outgroup, in this case, immigrants. this relationship 
is typically explained as a result of one of two phenomena: 
competition or contact theory, each of which is discussed further. 
My aim was to propose and subsequently test a set of hypotheses 
which reconcile these two theoretical approaches by incorporating 
elements of both into a single parsimonious model. At the center 
of my proposed model and the innovative aspect of my research, 
is the replacement of the linear models used in both contact and 
competition theories with a curvilinear description of the research 
question proposed here: what is the relationship between levels 
of electoral support for far right anti-immigrant parties and the 
size of the immigrant population? I turn first to a discussion of the 
patterns of migration in europe and then of the political responses 
to those patterns.
History of the Migrant Influx
the massive migration that marked the second half of the 20th 
century in europe was born out of the rubble of the second World 
War. the reconstruction of a continent ravaged by war required 
more than the mere replacement of damaged and destroyed 
buildings. entire economies and societies had to be rebuilt. While 
much of the money for the reconstruction efforts was supplied by 
the United states through the Marshall Plan, there was not enough 
labor to support the rapidly growing economy of the reemerging 
europe. As a result, many countries began to look beyond their 
borders to find new workers, actively recruiting through two 
primary methods: guest worker programs and colonial migration 
regimes.
the clearest example of a nation that used the guest worker 
approach is Germany, whose program for Gastarbeiter brought in 
workers from southern europe and beyond, particularly turkey. 
the government established a series of bilateral agreements 
with each country to allow workers to move to West Germany 
in order to support and drive the economic boom. Between 1955 
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and 1973 alone, the West German government recruited over 2.5 
million of these guest workers (Boswell, 2005). Under the plan, 
workers were to return to their home countries during economic 
slowdowns, with the hope of returning to Germany once the 
economy rebounded. Initially, the Gastarbeiter program saw 
spectacular success, and during the first major postwar recession, 
many did return to their homelands (Hansen 2003).
the great colonial powers of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries faced many of the same issues as Germany after the war, 
but approached the recruitment of labor in a different way in order 
to take advantage of the resources provided to them through the 
territories still under their rule. Among these were Great Britain, 
Belgium, and France. Many of their economies were not seeing 
the rapid growth of the Germans or other european powers, and 
were thus less attractive to prospective workers. Rather than 
initiating bilateral agreements, these countries instead made all 
inhabitants of their colonies full citizens (primarily as a result of 
other political pressures), granting a host of unskilled laborers 
unrestricted movement to the home country (Hansen 2003). soon 
south Asians were pouring into Great Britain, as France saw 
similar movement from Algeria, which was technically a part of 
the French state rather than a colony. 
With the global economic slowdown resulting from 
the 1973 oil crisis, the vast majority of economic and labor 
immigration ground to a halt. However, rather than stopping the 
migrant flow into europe, this halt simply shifted the reason for 
movement. Governments began limiting the influx of workers and 
implementing measures to encourage existing workers to move 
back to their native countries. However, these measures had the 
unintended effect of solidifying the presence of existing workers. 
Business owners did not want to lose well-trained and experienced 
labor without the hope for replacements willing to work for low 
pay. the immigrants themselves were hesitant to leave, fearing 
that they would not be able to return once the economy had 
regained speed (Lucassen, 2005).
the Germans went so far as to limit the amount given as 
family allowances for children abroad, but instead of forcing 
the workers to return home, their children came to Germany 
(Lucassen, 2005). Across europe, the primary reason for 
migration became family reunification, and the wives, children, 
and parents of immigrant workers began to move to rejoin the 
young males that had moved to find work. early attempts by 
european governments to limit family immigration were met 
with stiff human rights opposition and were often foiled in courts, 
thus allowing reunification to move forward. During this period, 
the labor migration that did occur was restricted to high skilled 
laborers (Geddes, 2003).
the shift to family reunification heavily impacted native 
european views of immigrants. Whereas many members of the 
first wave of labor immigrants had been tolerated given their 
contribution to economic development, the influx of non-working 
migrant women, children, and elderly was viewed as more of a 
cultural threat. It was at this point that the considerable difference 
in birth rates between immigrants and natives began to manifest 
itself. the decision of many immigrants to remain in place for 
the long term, coupled with the arrival of their families (and the 
resulting offspring), produced a rapidly expanding immigrant 
population while native populations stagnated (statham 2003).
the changing face of europe will have major consequences 
for the future, especially in the area of religion. What was once a 
homogenously christian (overwhelming Roman catholic) europe 
has already begun to disintegrate, as the major influxes of non-
european immigrants come from regions of Africa, the Middle 
east, and south Asia with predominantly Muslim populations. 
the growth of Islam across europe is one of the greatest lines of 
conflict that has been established between immigrants and native 
europeans. It is a trend playing out across the continent. While 
ethnic european birthrates plummet, Muslim immigrant birthrates 
remain very high. the total Muslim population of europe is 
projected to double by 2015, while ethnic europeans are likely to 
decline by 3.5 percent. the trend is even larger in cities, many of 
which are expected to be half foreign or more within the century 
(shore, 2006). 
The Political Response
the growth in immigration has been mirrored in many areas 
by a rise of numerous far right anti-immigrant political parties 
that have capitalized on a spreading xenophobia within europe. 
these parties are not geographically constrained to a single 
country and have gained toeholds in a number of nations that 
have long been heralded as examples of liberalism and tolerance. 
In fact, one of the most successful examples of this phenomenon 
is the Schweizerische Volkspartei (sVP) of switzerland. In the 
2007 federal elections, the sVP was able to garner 28% of the 
vote, the highest vote total for any single party in swiss history. 
the sVP has been able to rally support around its extremely 
restrictive immigration policies, including a controversial ban 
on the construction of minarets that was approved via national 
referendum in late 2009. At the time of the vote, there were only 
four minarets in the entire country, none of which were used for a 
call to prayer (erlanger, 2009).
Another famous example of a far right party that has 
thrived on its anti-immigrant positions is seen in France. the 
post-crisis era saw the rise of Front National, a far-right party 
that found its cause in the anti-immigrant movement. Led by 
archconservative Jean-Marie Le Pen, Front National saw modest 
electoral success, consistently exceeding 10% in multiparty 
federal elections, and gaining seats in the european Parliament. 
Le Pen’s strongest support came as a result of his vocal criticism 
of immigrant groups. In 1984, 39% of the national Front voters 
cited immigration as their primary concern, and in 1986, this 
number jumped to 60% of the same voting group (Golder, 2003). 
today, Front National advocates for the cancellation of family 
reunification immigration, shortening the permitted stay from 10 
to 3 years, and sending criminals back to the country of origin 
(Front national, 2010).
the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Austrian Freedom 
Party, traces its roots all the way back to the nazi occupation 
of Austria. though it was not officially formed until 1956, 
as the conglomeration of three different right-wing groups, it 
was strongly associated with the fervently nationalistic and 
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conservative positions of the nazi party. It saw little success for 
most of the cold War, typically garnering just 6-7% of the national 
vote. By the early 1980s, the party was beginning to splinter, as 
many of the more conservative elements were unhappy with the 
increasingly liberal leadership of norbert steger.
Both the party’s goals and its subsequent fortunes underwent 
dramatic shifts in 1986 when Jörg Haider supplanted steger as 
head of the party. It was at this point that the FPÖ began taking 
on a more stridently anti-immigrant image, a perception that 
Haider readily fostered and used to help boost the party to nearly 
10 percent of the vote in november of the same year. Just over 
a decade later, the Freedom Party had become a force to be 
reckoned with in Austrian politics. It shocked outside observers 
by capturing almost 27 percent of the vote in the 1999 federal 
elections, enough to push the party into second place and into part 
of a governing coalition with the center-right Austrian People’s 
Party. though few parties outside of the government were willing 
to deal with the Freedom Party, it managed nonetheless to legislate 
a more restrictive immigration policy that ultimately cut asylum 
applications by more than a half (Luther, 2004). the following 
years saw a tapering off of support for a party that best functioned 
as a voice of opposition, and support was further deflated when 
Haider himself died in a car accident in 2008.
Interestingly, the United Kingdom and some countries of 
southern europe have not seen comparable political movements 
against immigration. While parties espousing such positions 
certainly exist, they have not come close to replicating the success 
of Front national or the FPÖ. the reason for this lack of success 
is unclear. It may be a result of any number of differences across 
european nations, ranging from structural factors, like minor 
party access to the ballot, to individual level factors, such as voter 
tolerance or lack thereof.
several existing studies analyzing support for extreme right 
parties (eRPs) at the individual level, for example, have pointed 
out the strong positive correlation between anti-immigrant or 
xenophobic attitudes and a voter’s likelihood to support an eRP 
candidate (Lubbers, scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Knigge 1998). 
As Kessler (2005) points out, the relationship is rather self-
evident: “these prospective extreme right voters express a host 
of imagined or real grievances, blaming migrants for perceived 
reductions in the quality of children’s education, abuse of the 
welfare system, increases in unemployment, and rises in crime, 
violence, and delinquency” (273).
one key analytical advantage that researchers in the area are 
presented with is the aforementioned variability across european 
countries in terms of eRP support, since it allows us to hold 
certain variables relatively constant while others vary. I return 
to this theme in my research design section, which follows a 
discussion of current theoretical explanations for the growth in 
anti-immigrant sentiments.
Theoretical Perspectives
Competition Theory
currently, of the two common explanations for anti-
immigrant attitudes, the predominant one is the idea of ethnic 
competition (Knigge 1998, Lubbers et al. 2002, scheepers et 
al. 2002, Alexseev 2006). It is based in the concept of realistic 
group conflict theory, which seeks to explain the tensions between 
groups seeking resources and power in a society (coser 1956, 
Duke 1976). essentially, when one group has access to limited 
resources, any increase in demand for those resources (i.e. the 
arrival of an outgroup) becomes a threat to those that originally 
had access, the ingroup. the closer the relationship between the 
two groups, the more vigorous the competition between them 
becomes. thus, as the size of an outgroup increases, the contact 
that individuals in the ingroup have with them increases as well. 
elevated awareness of the existence of the outgroup in turn leads 
to an escalation in the level of competition, manifesting itself in 
increased hostility towards the newcomers (Banton, 1983).
According to competition theory then, migration directly 
results in an antagonistic relationship between ingroup and 
outgroup. the basis upon which members of each group delineate 
themselves from the ‘other’ may be language, ethnicity, or 
religion. Distinctions such as these help to clearly delineate the 
boundaries between ingroup and outgroup, thus eliminating the 
possibility of boundary dissolution over time.
the question of ethnic competition then turns to the matter 
of the resources that are being fought over. some studies have 
focused primarily on competition for basic needs and resources. 
Included in this grouping would be issues such as employment and 
access to education, among other government provided services 
(campbell 1965; sherif 1966). A less tangible but no less potent 
resource may be that of culture and identity (tajfel and turner 
1979). 
France’s long simmering immigration debate has featured 
both of these types of resource conflicts, laid bare with tragic 
consequences in the tumultuous autumn of 2005. In that year, the 
deaths of two immigrant teenagers sparked a series of riots around 
Paris and across the country. thousands of cars were burned by 
rioters that were predominantly young immigrant men. What had 
started as anger over the deaths boiled over into a national crisis as 
the riots became an outlet for many of these working-age men to 
express their frustrations at the lack of employment opportunities 
available to them. According to Ford, immigrant rage at pernicious 
discrimination and dismal job prospects provides an unequivocal 
example of materialistic competition (Ford, 2005). 
equally contentious was the issue of the 2004 ban on the 
wearing of headscarves in public schools. some native French 
view the headscarf as a symbol of outsiders amongst them, fearing 
a loss of identity as that population grows. Regardless of the 
source of inter-group competition, the consequences are similar if 
not identical. 
thus, according to competition theory, increases in the 
size of the outgroup, in this case immigrants, will coincide with 
proportional increases in electoral support for eRPs as a result 
of increased threat to the ingroup’s resource pool. the resulting 
relationship will be a positive and linear.
Contact Theory
contact theory posits the opposite effect, arguing that the 
size of the outgroup actually has a negative relationship with 
anti-immigrant attitudes. In simple terms, it is easy to vote for 
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parties that demonize immigrants when one has little contact with 
those immigrants. As an unknown specter, immigrants can take 
on whatever characteristics an eRP may wish to apply to them. 
However, once a voter has contact with immigrants, they are able 
to make the judgment for themselves, and their conclusion rarely 
coincide with public portrayals put forth by eRPs. 
Williams (1947) points out that most actions undertaken to 
resolve intergroup conflict rest upon the assumption that increased 
contact results in personal connections that overcome the 
competition impulse. McLaren (2003) found evidence to support 
this theory in the case of european immigration. In her research, 
those who had multiple immigrant friends perceived the general 
immigrant community to be a lesser threat than those who had no 
contact with immigrants.
early research on the contact hypothesis posited that it only 
applied in very limited circumstances that were rarely seen. 
conditions put forth by Allport (1954) included equal status, 
common goals, and support for contact from authority. In many of 
the migration situations seen in europe, meeting these conditions 
was practically impossible. Later work expanded on Allport’s, 
saying that contact could increase anti-outgroup sentiment just as 
much as it could decrease it. Amir (1969) makes this point, citing 
some of the component ideas of realistic group conflict theory. He 
then develops Allport’s conditions, positing that the contact must 
be desired, and that it can either occur between members of equal 
status or a member of the majority and a outgroup member of 
even higher social status. this difference in socioeconomic status 
is an important distinction in assessing the validity of contact 
theory. essentially, it states that horizontal contact, such as that 
between a Moroccan immigrant worker and his working-class 
Dutch neighbor, will result in a much greater shift in attitude than 
the vertical contact between a wealthy Austrian family and their 
turkish house workers.
 However, more recent research has shown that contact does 
not have to occur under such stringent settings. Pettigrew (1998) 
found that even relatively coincidental contact could result in 
improved relations between ingroup and outgroup. An earlier 
study in German schools had found similar results, tying leisure 
time and the incidental contact with turks that it provided to 
decreasing prejudice against the outgroup (Wagner, Hewstone, & 
Machleit, 1989). 
A Tipping Point?
While the competition versus contact theoretical debate has 
been going on for some time now, there has been little research 
into a middle ground between the two. Both sides certainly have 
considerable research and evidence to back up their claims, but 
interaction between them is notably absent. this is particularly 
interesting given that both hypotheses seem to fall apart as we 
approach their extremes. Under ethnic competition theory, a 
population fully saturated with immigrants would have the highest 
rates of anti-immigrant voting, a clearly illogical conclusion as 
these immigrants would be unlikely to vote against their own 
interests. on the other hand, the contact hypothesis faces issues at 
the opposite extreme: completely homogenous communities, those 
devoid of immigrants, would hypothetically have the highest rates 
of support for anti-immigrant parties. Again, this does not follow, 
as the community would assumedly have very little cause to vote 
against a nonexistent population. 
In almost all of the existing literature, the assumption of 
linearity seems to be taken as a certainty rather than as a part of 
the hypothesis. schlueter and scheepers (2009) even conducted 
a study testing both hypotheses simultaneously on the same 
data, finding significant support for both theories. Despite this 
seemingly contradictory result, the authors failed to present any 
challenge to the linear model. the possibility of a curvilinear 
relationship, made up of the simultaneously acting theories, offers 
a potential solution to this contradiction. 
such an idea has been put forward by schneider (2007) but 
even schneider did not seem to think that the relationship was 
entirely curvilinear, in that she predicted a “tapering off” of eRP 
voting rather than a decrease. Her study looked at the issue at the 
national level, analyzing 20 different eU countries. two other 
authors have recently found evidence for a curve, but both are 
in limited settings. Rather than focusing on all non-european 
immigrants as the outgroup, one study zeroed in on Muslim 
immigrants in the netherlands, and the other looked only at the 
performance of the Vlaams Blok in Belgium (Rink et al. 2009; 
savelkoul, et al. 2010). Again, in both of the cases, the curve 
seemed to be more of a tapering off than a decrease in support for 
the extreme right. 
Hypotheses
the first two hypotheses that I tested stemmed from the 
predominant theories of competition and contact. the decreasing 
access to resources referenced in competition theory indicates 
a positive linear relationship between immigrant population 
size and eRP voting, the relationship presented in my first 
hypoth esis. contact theory led to my second hypothesis, which 
asserts that increasing immigrant population size will lead, in 
turn, to increased opportunities for contact and interaction, thus 
decreasing xenophobia and electoral support for eRPs. Whereas 
the first hypothesis was a positive linear relationship, this second 
hypothesis postulates instead a negative linear relationship.
A curvilinear relationship would indicate that ethnic 
competition begins as the stronger factor, driving anti-immigrant 
sentiment for a time, but once the outgroup population reaches a 
certain size, the augmented opportunities for interaction with the 
ingroup lead to a strengthening of the contact theory, bringing the 
curve back down after a maximum point of anti-immigrant voting. 
this curvilinear relationship became my third hypothesis to be 
tested, and in doing so I both incorporated existing theories and 
also posited a relationship that would fill a gap that heretofore has 
existed in the literature on eRP support and immigration.
Levels of Analysis
one of the very important matters that had to be addressed 
in this case was the level of analysis. In the existing literature, 
the scope of studies varied from continent-wide, analyzing at the 
national level and including various examples (Lubbers 2002), 
to looking at subnational units as small as counties in a single 
country (Alexseev, 2006). the level chosen can have a significant 
impact on the results, as it also indicates a shift in the resource 
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pool referred to for competition theory. As Quillian (1996) points 
out, “the correct unit at which to measure the influences is 
difficult to define precisely, since people probably picture relations 
between their own racial group and other racial groups at more 
than one level (city, state, region, or nation) depending on the 
context.”
this debate also brings into account a previously mentioned 
issue about the contact hypothesis, and that is the question of 
the nature of the contact. If growing immigrant populations are 
confined to ethnic ghettoes, it becomes very unlikely that voters 
will have the opportunity for chance interactions that would 
hypothetically be expected to shift their attitudes. In some cases, 
it may even serve to intensify competition as it adds geography to 
the list of factors that can be used to draw the boundary between 
ingroup and outgroup.
A substantial portion of the existing research also looks at the 
issue at the individual level, examining individual socioeconomic, 
demographic, and opinion data to see its effect on anti-immigrant 
voting. For example, McLaren (2003) explores the relationship 
using survey responses that discuss the threat perception of 
individual voters, and then links it with immigrant contact 
and eRP support. other studies that bring economic level and 
education into account have shown a significant relationship 
between those factors and eRP support, and unlike threat 
perception, these factors can be analyzed easily at a level greater 
than the individual, and thus were incorporated into my analysis.
In this research, data was analyzed at the first-order civil 
division level for each nation (the level of administration just 
below the central state government), as previous research has 
shown the effect of immigration on voting patterns to be higher 
when evaluated at the level of smaller units (Alexseev 2006). 
Additionally, subnational analysis appeared more warranted since 
public opinion is very rarely homogenous at the national level, but 
often does begin to demonstrate more convergence as the unit of 
analysis decreases.1 Breaking from the typical approach taken by 
researchers in this field, I concentrated on the subnational analysis, 
but it spanned across four different case nations in order to test the 
hypotheses in more varied environments.
the scales and autonomy of first-order civil divisions among 
my cases varied substantially. the simplest measure of regions 
is the nomenclature of territorial Units for statistics (nUts) 
established by the european Union for the purposes of eurostat, 
the eU statistical database. the nUts for all eU countries are 
divided into 4 levels: nUts 0 is the national level, nUts 1 is 
the next largest, then down to the smallest nUts 3 divisions. For 
most of these countries, nUts 1 is simply an agglomeration of 
administrative regions with little meaning in the national context. 
In Austria, spain, and Belgium, nUts 2 actually corresponds 
directly with the first order administrative regions. 
However, the nUts designations for the United Kingdom do 
in fact correspond with a relevant layer of administration, namely 
Government office Regions, scotland, Wales, and northern 
Ireland.2 Furthermore, while boundaries of lower nUts levels 
typically correspond with voting districts, this is not so in the UK, 
thus necessitating the use of the nUts 1 level in its case. since 
the data for the control variables all came from an eU database, 
the indicator variables are all defined within the nUts regions 
and using smaller divisions than nUts 1 would have introduced 
a great deal of error into the models. therefore, I worked at the 
nUts 2 level in all countries except the United Kingdom. even 
given this apparent disparity, there was a rough balance across 
case nations as each country included between 10 and 20 regions 
at the specified levels. As well, there was complete balance 
in terms of the number of elections analyzed with two cycles 
examined for each of the case countries, thus yielding a total 
number of 100 observations.
the dependent variable in this case was the percentage of 
votes garnered by extreme right parties in european Parliament 
elections. Using the results of a survey conducted by Lubbers 
(2000), I was able to classify parties in each country. the survey 
polled 150 european political scientists, asking them to place 
parties on a left to right ideological scale with 1 being far left and 
10 being far right, and to rank these parties by the restrictiveness 
of their proposed immigration policies. I focused exclusively on 
parties that qualify as “extreme right” on both of these measures, 
those with a score greater than nine on each scale. 
on the basis of Lubbers’ scale, I chose four countries for my 
analysis: Belgium, spain, Austria, and the United Kingdom. there 
were actually six parties in the final analysis, given the division of 
Belgium between the Dutch-speaking Flanders and francophone 
Wallonia as well as the existence of two spanish extreme right 
parties on Lubbers’ scale. the parties were: Vlaams Blok (VP) of 
Flanders, Front National (Fn) of Wallonia, the British National 
Party (BnP), Democracia Nacional (Dn) and the Falange 
Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FE 
de las JONS) of spain, and the Freiheitlicht Partei Österreichs 
(FPÖ) of Austria. over the span of time that I measured, some of 
these parties saw significant organizational changes. For example, 
the Vlaams Blok actually became the Vlaams Belang as of late 
2004 after a court ruled that the Blok had violated laws against 
xenophobic incitement. 
Immigrant population size can be measured in a variety of 
ways, but for the purposes of this research, I defined that variable 
as the percentage of non-european Union legal residents. this 
is because the lack of border controls between eU countries, a 
result of the 1984 schengen agreement, makes internal migration 
more fluid and thus more difficult to measure with precision. 
Also, the ethnic and cultural boundaries between groups involved 
in conflict are more substantial with non-eU migrants than 
with other eU members. While an Italian immigrant in France 
may face considerable difficulty with regards to language, he is 
still navigating in a society very similar to his own, with nearly 
identical values. the same cannot be said for an Algerian in 
1 Unfortunately, I did not have access to individual level data in these areas.  Any analysis of the results of this research must therefore  
avoid the ecological fallacy, that is, using the behavior of the group as a whole to predict the action of an individual. 
2 northern Ireland was eliminated from the analysis given that the British national Party did not run in their elections.
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France. His color, accent and faith all set him apart from the rest 
of the “native” population, and he is much more likely to evoke a 
response as he is more clearly a member of the outgroup under the 
provisions of realistic group contact theory. While a measure of 
immigrant population that included illegal immigrants would be 
ideal, this information is understandably difficult to attain with any 
measure of validity.
My analysis involved model estimations using multivariate 
ordinary least squares regression. the models provided 
coefficients that indicated the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables. since I hypothesized 
a curvilinear relationship between extreme right support and 
our primary predictor variable, outgroup size, I introduced a 
quadratic term (squaring the immigrant population size) to test 
for curvilinearity. While the numerical values associated with this 
squared term provide little useful information, the sign of the term 
will tell us whether or not a curve is present. A positive linear 
coefficient in combination with a negative quadratic coefficient 
indicates a curvilinear relationship of the sort predicted in my 
hypothesis (i.e., one resembling the classic normal bell curve). 
I also tested for linear relationships with other variables, 
drawn from the existing research literature on the topic of extreme 
right electoral support, in order to account for their effect on the 
general trends. While education level is one of the most widely 
used predictors of this support, I included income level, economic 
status, and urbanization, as discussed in the following section. 
Cases and Data
My dependent variable was the percentage vote received 
by the eRPs in the european Parliamentary elections of 2004 
and 2009 respectively, derived using information contained in 
the european election Database (norwegian social science 
Data services, 2011). there are two reasons that the european 
Parliament elections were used as valid measures of support for 
this study. 3 
the first is the centralization of migration-related powers that 
has occurred over the past two decades. the eU is seeking to and 
has succeeded in broadening its capability to deal with migration 
as a europe-wide issue (Geddes, 2003). the immigration debate 
has been cast in terms of a monolithic european culture by 
many of the extreme right parties analyzed here. As put by Geert 
Wilders in a speech to the British House of Lords regarding 
Muslim immigration, largely turkish and north African: “Islam 
means submission, there cannot be any mistake about its goal. 
that’s a given. the question is whether we in europe and you 
in Britain, with your glorious past, will submit or stand firm for 
your heritage” (Wilders, 2010). As the identity set in conflict with 
the immigrant is defined as a pan-european one with a common 
heritage, it would make sense that voters in perceived conflict with 
the outgroup would seek solutions at the europe-wide level. 
the second strength of eP election data is the increased 
influence that the body has wielded in the last decade. the 2004 
and 2009 elections followed a period of growth resulting from 
the treaties of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Voting reforms had 
strengthened the Parliament in comparison with the powerful 
european commission and council of Ministers, with the co-
decision process giving it an essential veto on many important 
policy matters. A turning point for the institution came in 1998 
when, after years of largely rubber-stamp work, the Parliament 
refused the budget of eU commissioner Jacques santer and 
eventually forced the resignation of his entire commission due to 
allegations of corruption and gross mismanagement (topan, 2002). 
With a newly empowered Parliament, it is much more likely that 
voters in recent years would see the body as a potential agent of 
change to a greater degree than they had prior to 1992. 
the makeup of the non-eU immigrant populations in these 
countries also provided an interesting and useful comparison. the 
United Kingdom, as a result of its colonial legacy, is primarily 
a destination for south Asian immigrants. Austria has a more 
varied makeup. Following the example of its neighbor Germany, it 
recruited massive numbers of turkish workers, but there are also 
sizeable numbers of former Balkan residents who moved to flee 
the wars there during the 1990s. spain, unlike the others, has many 
immigrants from Latin America as it is a natural destination for the 
continent’s spanish speakers. Its geographic proximity to north 
Africa has also led to large Moroccan and Algerian communities 
in some areas. Belgium’s immigrants are also primarily Moroccan, 
though they live alongside a considerable turkish population as 
well, and were recruited as guest workers.
the four selected countries provided the opportunity to test 
my hypotheses across a range of demographic configurations. the 
proportion of immigrants of non-european origin in Belgium is 
only 2.9%, the lowest of the four and among the lowest in Western 
europe, whereas Austria has the largest foreign presence of the 
four, nearly 7% of their populace (see table 1 for descriptive 
statistics). the cases also show variance on the side of the 
dependent variable, as far-right parties like the Vlaams Blok and 
the Freedom Party have seen considerable success in Belgium and 
Austria, whereas the spanish anti-immigrant party, Democracia 
nacional, has never generated a significant amount of support.
choosing an accurate measure of the education levels in 
each region proved to be a challenge. As with all of the variables, 
there are no individual level measures for participating voters, 
so I needed some contextual measure of education levels for the 
region as a whole. the data that I used came from the quarterly 
Labor Force survey (LFs) conducted by member nations under 
the auspices of eU control. “the eU LFs is a large household 
sample survey providing quarterly results on labor participation 
of people aged 15 and over as well as on persons outside the 
3 european Parliament elections are under the control of member countries, but provide a more standardized measure.  they enable us 
to eliminate variation introduced by time differences that may have occurred between individual national elections.  elections consist of 
national parties who then sit in large ideological coalitions once seated in Parliament.  the extreme right parties analyzed here all sit as 
non-inscrits, not part of any coalition.
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labor force. All definitions apply to persons aged 15 years and 
over living in private households” (eurostat, 2010). the highest 
level of education attained was defined on the education levels of 
the International standard classification of education (IsceD), 
established by Unesco in 1997. 
the LFs data aggregates these levels into three groups: 
respondents with only primary level education or none at all, 
respondents who have completed secondary education, and 
respondents who have completed tertiary education, be it 
university or some kind of professional degree. the figures used 
in this study represent percentages of the total respondents and 
exclude respondents in the 15-24 age bracket. the logic of this 
exclusion is that such individuals would in the first instance likely 
still be pursuing completion of their secondary or tertiary studies, 
and in the second instance, those under 18 would not have been 
eligible to vote in the elections being analyzed. 
two different measures were used to determine the impact 
of economic context upon the dependent variables. the first, 
unemployment rate, provided a measure of economic competition 
at the contextual level. competition theory would predict a 
positive relationship between the unemployment rate and eRP 
support, as greater numbers of people looking for jobs would 
theoretically lead to a heightened sense of competition with the 
outgroup.
the other economic measure provided a sense of income 
distribution between regional units. this data also comes from 
eurostat’s Labor Force survey, as I utilized the Gross Domestic 
Product per capita of each region4. to avoid the cross-national 
distortions that using raw amounts would introduce, I indexed 
the amounts to the average regional GDP per capita for the entire 
european Union, setting it equal to 100 and normalizing the other 
values around it. All amounts were measured in euros to account 
for differences in exchange rates. 
the final control variable included was a measure of 
urbanization. While not frequently cited as an important factor in 
the literature, I included it because of the role that segregation of 
outgroup communities can play in both competition and contact 
theories. As Massey and Denton (1989) find in the case of the 
United states, the segregation of black communities actually 
increased when one looks at more metropolitan areas. on a 
basic level, this makes sense since urban areas would be more 
likely magnets for immigration and thus have larger immigrant 
populations. the larger population can then in turn lead to a 
more self-sufficient outgroup community. the effect of this 
“ghettoization” is the same under both contact and competition 
theory. It both limits opportunities for contact and deepens lines of 
division, leading to more eRP support in both cases.
the data on urbanization levels also came from the Labor 
Force survey. It provides the number of households in each region 
based on the population density of their immediate area. there are 
three levels of urbanization: densely populated (more than 500 
inhabitants per square kilometer), intermediate (between 100 and 
499 inhabitants per square kilometer), and sparsely populated (less 
than 100 inhabitants per square kilometer). to facilitate analysis, 
I turned each of these numbers into percentages of the total 
respondents divided by urbanization level.
Results
I estimated two separate models using sPss statistical 
analysis software. Results are displayed in table 2. the first 
model tested my first two hypotheses regarding the apparently 
contradictory linear predictions of contact versus competition 
theory. As both of these hypothesized relationships were linear, 
the quadratic term was not included. All of the tested variables 
were significant at the .01 level except for the unemployment rate. 
the model had a very robust adjusted R-square value of 0.489, 
meaning that the model could account for 48.9% of the variation 
across cases. the negative estimated coefficient on the predictor 
variable, percentage of immigrants, indicates decreasing electoral 
support for the eRPs as immigrant population increases, thus 
leading me to reject my first hypothesis. My second hypothesis 
based upon contact theory, by contrast, is supported by the 
regression analysis.
Model II introduced a quadratic term to test my third 
Variable 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Percent support for ERPs 100 .04 27.47 5.64 6.31 
Percentage of immigrants 100 .72 13.60 4.57 3.41 
Unemployment Rate 100 2.90 26.20 9.28 5.41 
Percentage with Tertiary 
Education 
100 12.52 48.54 27.52 7.53 
Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (indexed to EU average) 
100 60 256 112.05 34.10 
Percentage of region with low 
urbanization 
100 .00 1.00 .25 .24 
Valid N (listwise) 100     
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the model.
Table 2. Regression results displaying independent variables, estimated coefficient 
(expressing probability to vote for an extreme right party) and standard error in 
parentheses; (n= 100)
4 one important caveat to the use of GDP per capita is that, given its nature as an average, outliers, typically high outliers, can throw it 
off and thus it may not provide a full picture of regional income without distribution data.
Variable Model I Model II 
Constant 10.631 (3.128)** 13.212 (3.647)** 
   
Percentage of immigrants
 
-0.817 (0.196)** -1.569 (.586)** 
(Percentage of immigrants)
2
  0.062 (.046) 
   
Percentage with tertiary level education -0.333 (0.078)** -0.346 (0.078)** 
Percentage of region with low 
urbanization 
-8.250 (2.294)** -8.119 (2.286)** 
Unemployment Rate -0.178 (.117) -0.192 (0.117) 
Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(indexed to EU average) 
0.104 (.022)** 0.098 (0.023)** 
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hypothesis, which posits a curvilinear relationship between 
immigrant population size and eRP support. the adjusted 
R-square value was marginally higher: 0.499. In this model, we 
see a stronger negative correlation with the linear term, but the 
squared term is not significant. the results of the second model 
provided greater support for my second hypothesis than for either 
of the other two hypothesized models, including my curvilinear 
one.
Discussion
Hypotheses
the strong evidence for contact theory provided by my 
regression models was initially a surprise, as ethnic competition 
has been the more dominant theory in much of the existing corpus 
of literature on the issue. some aspects of the predictor variable, 
outgroup size, may have contributed to this result.
the first of these is the matter of my definition of the variable. 
Due to the limitations of available data, I was unable to get a full 
sense of the outgroup size. For example, I could not include illegal 
immigrants or immigrants that have been naturalized and left their 
original citizenship behind. While this information is available 
at the national level (schneider, 2007) and occasionally at lower 
levels in specific circumstances (savelkoul, scheepers, tolsma, 
& Hagendoorn, 2010), there are no comparable data on these 
other segments of the migrant community at the regional level. 
It is quite possible that the communities with a smaller foreign 
national community have a large naturalized population that still 
functions as an outgroup, but goes unaccounted for in this model. 
subsequent inquiries would be much enhanced with measurements 
of both the illegal and naturalized communities, as they would 
enable a more rigorous testing for the presence of a curvilinear 
relationship. 
the second issue that may have contributed to my 
unexpected results is the absence of significant time differences 
in measurement. While the hypothesized curve does not include 
an explicit temporal measure indicator, it is possible that shifting 
contextual circumstances may mitigate the competition effect over 
time. As discussed earlier, immigration has long been framed as 
a europe-wide issue, and the recession of the 1970s that began 
much of the backlash against immigration affected the continent as 
a whole. the presence of these extreme right parties, regardless of 
their levels of success, has been a feature of the european political 
landscape since that era. ethnic competition theory proposes that 
increasing migrant presence increases awareness of conflict, thus 
deepening anti-immigrant sentiment. Given the extensive nature 
of anti-immigrant rhetoric that had existed for years before the 
elections analyzed in this study, perhaps the awareness of conflict 
had already been maximized, regardless of immigrant presence. 
such a situation would leave decreases in anti-immigrant voting 
resulting from contact as the only effect significantly related with 
the size of the outgroup.
Other Variables of Interest
Most of the relationships with the independent control 
variables found in these results are consistent with the 
conventional wisdom of existing immigration research. I decided 
to use only tertiary education as the educational measure based 
on support in the existing literature regarding what aspects of 
education impact outgroup perceptions. Hainmueller and Hiscox 
(2007) found that “college education has far greater positive 
effects on support for immigration than high school education, and 
finishing elementary schooling actually appears to have negative 
effects on support for immigration“ (Hainmueller, 2007, p. 424). 
the negative correlation coefficient on the education variable 
seems to support Hainmueller’s finding that as the percentage of 
the population that has completed university or comparable studies 
rises, district-wide (not individual) support for eRPs decreases.
the relationship with urbanization levels also follows the 
expected pattern. Assuming that ghettoization could occur even in 
mid-sized urban areas, I utilized the low urbanization level data to 
explore the relationship with eRP voting. Given that the data used 
is a percentage that sums to one when combined with intermediate 
and high urbanization, higher percentages of sparsely populated 
area mean fewer people living in urban areas, and thus fewer 
opportunities for segregation. the results illustrate a very strong 
relationship between eRP vote and urbanization. As the proportion 
of the population living in sparsely populated areas increases, eRP 
support drops dramatically.
Unemployment was the only control variable included in the 
models that did not turn out to be statistically significant. In fact, 
this too coincides with preceding research. numerous studies 
found unemployment rate to have an insignificant effect on eRP 
voting or threat perception (Lubbers et al. 2002; scheepers, 
Gijsberts and coenders 2002; Rink et al. 2009). However, several 
of these also found that, when occupational status was included at 
the individual level, unemployment did have a significant effect, 
at least on threat perception. Given that such individual measures 
were beyond the scope of this study, there is little alternative 
to accepting that at least at the regional level, unemployment 
is a poor indicator of community-wide anti-immigrant voting 
proclivities.
the coefficent associated with income, measured here using 
GDP per capita, presents a more complex issue. It was significant, 
but indicated a positive relationship. that is, as the income 
increased, so did the support for eRPs. Given the previously stated 
relationship with tertiary education, this may seem contradictory, 
since the wealthier are typically better educated. In fact, though, it 
does fit with the tenets of contact theory. Recall that the literature 
indicates that there exist two kinds of contact. Ameliorative 
effects only derive from horizontal, not vertical, contact. As 
Amir (1969) emphasizes, the equal status of those involved 
in contact is essential. As income rises, one is less likely to 
encounter an immigrant of equal socioeconomic status, since most 
immigrants initially enter in pursuit of low salary work. Under 
such conditions, the contact becomes increasingly vertical with 
increasing income, and thus less effective. As we have already 
found contact theory to be the dominant phenomenon at play in 
this case, the income relationship ultimately does comport with 
expectations.
Conclusion
though the hypothesized curve did not find support in this 
study, the results still provide considerable reason for optimism in 
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europe’s coming years. the dominance of contact theory, whether 
it is in fact simply the downward portion of a curve that reached 
its maximum in the past or if it is truly the stronger phenomenon 
at play, is encouraging. the migrant influx shows no real signs 
of slowing, and europe will be required to adapt to the presence 
of this new community as the community itself adapts to its new 
surroundings. My findings indicate that they are doing just that. 
though further research will be required to discover if 
national general election data matches that of the european 
Parliament elections analyzed here, the trend is occurring as 
the eP grows in influence and capacity. My results may not 
inform the impending policies of individual nations, but as the 
european Union is taking on a more active role in the integration 
of the immigration regimes of member nations, it seems that 
restrictive anti-immigrant parties will hold less sway in the 
creation of the common policy. these results are also important 
for those ultimately charged with the creation of such policies. 
While electoral support of eRPs is just one of many measures 
of xenophobia, this study indicates that programs that encourage 
contact may aid in integration of immigrants. Irrespective of the 
national milieu, environs that facilitate greater contact between 
natives and migrants, particularly horizontal contact, will coincide 
with decreases in support for those who use xenophobia as a 
political cudgel in pursuit of elected office.
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Mentor Comments: Professor Jeffrey Ryan’s enthusiasm and 
respect for Andrew’s work is clear in the following mentor com-
ments.
From my perspective, not only as an advisor but a scholar 
as well, Andrew Walchuk’s thesis is an exemplar of how an 
undergraduate student can conduct first-rate scholarship 
when they commit themselves fully to the endeavor. I have 
supervised many, many honors theses in my 20-year career 
here and, quite simply, this is the very best of them all. I could, 
of course, go on for pages pointing out in detail how well 
conceived, constructed and presented Andrew’s work is, but 
instead would like to address two facets of his experience that, 
to me, represent the drive and temerity that lies at his essence.
The first facet is the extraordinary degree to which Andrew 
attacked this very ambitious process. From the start, he never 
looked back, never retreated and never wilted in the face of 
daunting challenges. We determined early on (actually, in 
the spring of his junior year) that, in order to appropriately 
and rigorously test his hypotheses, fairly sophisticated 
quantitative skills would be needed. As he did not at the 
time have these skills and as I am generously described as 
being semi-literate in this area, what did he do? First, he 
enrolled in an advanced statistical analysis course during 
his fall senior semester. Then, as he ventured deeper into 
his analysis, he arranged personal meetings with a faculty 
specialist who, no doubt impressed by this young man’s self-
drive and ambition, quickly agreed to tutor Andrew. Later, as 
he was gathering data, he found gaps in the availability of 
critical measures for a single case, so what did he do? Rather 
than simply discard the case and pursue an ‘easier’ one, he 
directly called electoral authorities in the relevant country. 
They quite helpfully provided the necessary data and Andrew, 
as ever, kept moving forward. This is who he is; voracious for 
knowledge, relentless in the face of obstacles and possessed of 
an intellect that is one of the sharpest that I have seen in my 
professional life. As I tell anyone who will listen, Andrew was 
a colleague, not a student. I was only along for the ride and a 
fantastic one at that.
The second facet represents to me the most significant 
contribution of this work to academia most broadly conceived. 
To put it in very simple terms, Andrew did his research the 
way it should be done. This may sound puzzling, but the 
disturbing truth is that we in our disciplines all too often 
actually pervert the process of scientific inquiry. How? By 
‘creatively’ selecting our cases, by ‘torturing’ the data and 
worst of all, by starting with our conclusions then working 
our way backwards. Why? Because our professional lives are 
driven by publication and our journals abet the corruption 
of research by generally refusing to publish negative 
results. Andrew, and especially this journal, deserve our 
highest accolades for having the courage to accept that 
his hypotheses were not supported by the evidence. This is 
genuine and pure scholarship and confronted by Andrew’s 
example, we in academia, including me, should collectively 
hang our heads in shame.
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